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These two volumes by Jungnickel and McCormmach (cited henceforth as J&M) 
are of central importance for the study of 19th-century physics. All historians of 
science interested in this period will henceforth have to consult this work before 
and during their research for it contains such a wealth of information that it can be 
ignored only at great scholarly peril. At the same time, however, readers should 
be aware of some serious flaws that make parts of it untrustworthy and mislead- 
ing. 
The cardinal virtue of this work rests on the treasure-trove of archival docu- 
ments that J&M have discovered and exploited. They have systematically exam- 
ined the documents relating to the teaching of physics in the German universities 
in the 19th and early 20th centuries. From these documents, they are able to give a 
detailed and rich picture of the institutional and social conditions in which German 
physics grew and developed. This part of their work is superb. Here the reader 
will find all one could ever wish to know about internal academic politics and its 
relationship to the teaching of physics; the funding of positions in physics; the 
attempts to squeeze out extra funds from governmental ministries whose knowl- 
edge and interest in physics was minimal; and all those other aspects of academic 
life that remain with us today. The reader will also find a rich description of the 
facilities for doing research in physics, of the founding and development of insti- 
tutes of physics, so central to the development of both experimental and theoreti- 
cal physics in Germany in the 19th century. There are even detailed accounts of 
the instruments available and bibliographical references permitting the reader to 
follow up the instrumental dimension. There is nothing else comparable to this 
work available today and it will, therefore, occupy the central position it deserves 
in the literature. One fundamental question did suggest itself, however, which 
J&M never address: given the well-documented fact that German physics con- 
stantly confronted local and ministerial financial and intellectual obstacles, how 
did the ~af~~wi~~e~~c~a~~w~~de~ that is 19th-century physics ever occur? The 
authors never raise this question. 
J&M however, aim at more than setting the institutional, political, and instru- 
mental scene within which theoretical physics developed. As they say in the 
preface to Volume I, “The goal of our study of German theoretical physics is to 
give an integrated account of the scientific work and its institutional setting” (p. 
xviii). And, further, “of equal importance to our study as the physicists’ institu- 
3!40 REVIEWS HM 15 
tional activities is their scientific work,” but they “do not give a complete and 
continuous history of their work since many studies have set out to do just that 
. . . ” (p. xviii). It is this further goal of placing the w& of theoretical physicists 
into the institutional context that leads to the more serious flaws. Let me detail 
them. 
Confusion begins at the start of Volume 1. What is theoretical physics? To be 
sure, no historically exact definition can be given for 1800, since the very concept 
did not really exist at this point. Nevertheless, it is possible to differentiate styles 
of physics that could all be considered as “theoretical physics” before the time of 
Ohm. Simply put, shall we consider theoretical physics to be the application of 
mathematics to experimental facts to determine a mathematical law? This would 
make experiment primary and mathematics the servant of the experimentahst. Or, 
should the theoretical physicist emulate Poisson, make some simple assumptions 
about the forces acting between electrical fluids, and then derive the equations for 
the distribution of electricity on the surfaces of bodies of different shapes by pure 
mathematics? It then becomes the task of the experimentalist to determine the 
validity of the derivation. Here theoretical physics leads and experiment follows. 
Or, finally, should the theoretical physicist occupy himself with the hidden cuuses 
of physical phenomena, that is, should he make up theoretical or noumenal enti- 
ties and then derive phenomenal laws from their assumed properties? All three of 
these approaches are described by J&M, but without comment. Thus, Kirchhoff’s 
“aim was to build equations that correspond to the phenomenal world as accu- 
rately as possible and with as little dependence as possible on anything hypotheti- 
cal” (p. 294). Gauss is quoted in Poissonian mode (p. 139) “I cannot formulate 
any idea of the cause of Volta’s fundamental theorem: in the event of the partici- 
pation of molecular forces, one might be able to think of something that is accessi- 
ble to calculation.” Neumann offers an orthodox Kantian view for, to Neumann, 
“to ‘explain’ is to reduce phenomena to the ‘fewest possible fundamental ideas’, 
which are themselves inexplicable, or ‘incomprehensible’ ” (p. 183). 
This failure to distinguish between the possible approaches to theoretical phys- 
ics creates a good deal of confusion, particularly in Volume 1. What is inexphca- 
ble is that it was clearly avoidable, for Kenneth Caneva has raised the problem 
quite specifically. In his 1975 Princeton dissertation, Caneva devoted almost 150 
pages to a discussion of the varieties of theoretical physics aborning in early 19th- 
century Germany. A more sophisticated and fully documented version of his 
thesis was published in 1978 in Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, a 
journal of which McCormmach is an editor. Yet, surprisingly, neither of these 
works is either cited or mentioned, although the journal article appears in the 
bibliography. This failure is a symptom of a deeper problem for the authors also 
fail to follow Caneva in discussing the influence of German philosophy on German 
physics. This is a truly fatal error for it robs their discussion of an essential 
dimension. Stated quite baldly, German physics and German philosophy were 
tightly bound together through most of the 19th century. 
J&M barely mention philosophy. “Almost to a man,” they write on p. 23, “the 
German university physicists declared themselves influenced by his [Kant’s] 
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work.” This is followed by a single paragraph that hardly does justice to Kantian 
philosophy and leaves the reader completely at sea unless he is already well 
acquainted with Kant’s works. Nor is Kant the only philosopher. Again, as 
Caneva made clear, &helling, Fichte, and Schleiermacher all influenced some of 
those whom J&M characterize as prototheoretical physicists. 
The failure to deal with the philosophical background to theoretical physics, 
together with the very brief accounts of the science actually done by theoretical 
physicists (only some 40 pages out of 350 in Volume I), vitiates the attempt to deal 
adequately with their chosen examples. Few, if any, of the short biographies here 
equal or go beyond those to be found in the Dictionary of Scienti$c Biography. 
Sometimes, the authors do add documents from their new findings that will be 
found useful, but they do not always apply them well. Again, part of the fault lies 
with their blindness to philosophy. Take the example of Ludwig Boltzmann, who 
served at least partially as a model for the hero of McCormmach’s novel on the 
Mght Thoughts of a Classical Physicist. (For what follows, I am completely 
indebted to my student, Andrew Wilson, who has just returned from Vienna 
where he delved into the Boltzmann manuscript Nachlass.) A minor, but confi- 
dence-destroying, fault is that the attribution to the Boltzmann manuscripts J&M 
cite is incorrect. They are not in the osterreichisches Staatsarchiv, Wien (de- 
scribed on p. 199 of Volume 2 as their “final home”) but in the Allgemeines 
Verwaltungsarchiv, undoubtedly moved there by the Austrian bureaucracy after 
they were consulted by J&M. One ought not to attribute anything &al to any 
bureaucracy. 
J&M describe Boltzmann’s university training by stating simply that he studied 
with Kunzek and Ettingshausen as well as with Lang and Stefan. This is true, but 
it is also misleading. Out of a total of 162 hours taken by Boltzmann in the years 
from 1863 to 1867, 16 were with Kunzek, 32 (of which 30 were laboratory courses) 
with Ettingshausen, 22 with Stefan, and 4 with Lang. What J&M ignore is 24 
hours of Analytical Mechanics with Petzval (which clearly influenced Boltz- 
mann’s later work) and 21 hours with the philosopher Zimmermann whose books 
were heavily annotated by Boltzmann. Surely Petzval and Zimmermann deserve 
at least a passing glance to determine if their influence might, indeed, permit us to 
understand Boltzmann’s work better. 
This one example may be atypical, but it caused me some concern about the 
way in which J&M read the rich manuscript vein they have uncovered. No one 
can follow their footsteps to check every source, but it is perhaps fair to suggest 
that their sources not be accepted without question. 
Let us now sum up. I repeat that this work is essential and that it contains much 
that is of great value to historians of modern physics. My criticisms, however, 
should indicate that the work should be used with some caution and readers 
should be aware that the picture that is presented is two-dimensional. The philo- 
sophical aspects remain to be investigated, and they are of basic importance. 
Finally, the mini-biographies add little new or original information to what J&‘&l 
have to say. In fact, had they omitted them and simply referred readers to the DSB 
they could probably have accomplished their goal in one volume at considerably 
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less expense to the reader. The work could then have borne the more accurate, 
although less rhetorical title, The Growth of the German Physical Community, 
1800-1925. 
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Hans-Jtirgen Engfer investigates the influence of the methods of mathematics 
upon (1) the continental European analytical tradition within rationalism during 
the 17th and early 18th centuries and (2) the German Auj7&rung during the second 
half of the 18th century. The section on the earlier period examines the method- 
ologies of Descartes, Leibniz, and Wolff. The late AujUrung section examines 
three prize competitions on methodology sponsored by the Berlin Academy of 
Sciences (1763, 1805, and 1809) and the emergence of the “critical” philosophy of 
Kant. 
Engfer’s topic is central to understanding the Enlightenment, in which reason 
was considered the key to method, and mathematics provided for many the ideal 
for reasoning- Mathematics had its own methods of synthesis and analysis. During 
the Enlightenment, “synthesis” referred to Euclid’s axiomatic method, and 
“analysis” largely referred to symbolic algebra and the new infinitesimal calculus. 
Because of its chronological limits, this book obviously does not deal with the 
mature stage of mathematical analysis of Cauchy, Weierstrass, Dedekind, and 
Cantor. 
This book begins in reverse chronological order with the Berlin Academy of 
Sciences’ prize competition on methodology in 1763. The question posed was 
whether metaphysical truths can be established with the same degree of certainty 
as those of geometry. The philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, who is known as the 
“German Socrates,” won the prize. His paper asserted that the proper method for 
a complete system of truths “is not the synthetic . . . but the analytic.” Im- 
manuel Kant agreed in his prize paper the next year and began to distinguish 
between the methods of mathematics and of metaphysics. Kant corresponded 
with Johann Lambert on these matters. An intense period of reform of analytic 
concepts and methods followed. Concern with analytic methods in philosophy 
remained central at the Berlin Academy through its prize competitions on the 
subject in 1805 and 1809. 
